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The last three decades have witnessed a relentless growth of Islamic movements, so
that, today political Islam is an undeniable reality on the world scene. The events of
September 11, 2001 and since have given it further prominence. From the Middle East
to North Africa and South Asia, it has, in its various manifestations, become a major
player that needs to be analysed both politically and theoretically. The contradictory
nature of political Islam means that such analyses must deal with it not only in relation
to the interests of capital,  but also in  relation to the challenge it  poses to socialist
ideas.
In many countries, the movements of political Islam raise their ﬂag as that of ‘seekers
of justice’  and  aim their  propaganda at  the poorest  and  most  deprived  sections of
society. They, thereby, present themselves as a rival to the forces of socialism and the
left.  The formulation  of a  strategy  to  respond  to this  challenge requires  a  deeper
understanding of the background to, and reasons for, these developments. This article
presents some preliminary theses, based on a necessarily limited and general outline of
the characteristics and peculiarities of the Islamic movements.
Amidst the ravages of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, then, political Islam is on the
rise, and its supporters portray it as the ideology of the poor and the dispossessed.
They  promise ‘a better  life’  for  the ‘disinherited’,  ‘less inequality’,  and  the ‘end  of
corruption’  through  the  rule  of ‘sharia’a’  (the  religious  state).  Yet  in  Iran,  almost
twenty-six years after coming to power with similar promises, Islamic government has
become synonymous with greed and corruption. Super-rich clerics and their immediate
families have replaced the ‘corrupt Royal court’ and its entourage. The poor get poorer
while  the  rich  get  richer.  (Ayatollah  Rafsanjani,  the  Islamic  regime’s  previous
president and likely to be its next president, is ranked the forty-third richest man in
the world by Forbes Magazine.)
What, then, is the basis of the political economy of Islamic fundamentalism? How does
it gain its supporters amongst the poor and the ‘dispossessed’? What is the relation
between the promises of equality in the rule of sharia’a and the real politics of Islamic
governance within the world capitalist order?
From the  1970s  onwards,  as  Islamic  societies  of  the  periphery  were  incorporated
ever-deeper  into  the  world  market,  the  centre-periphery  crisis  in  these  societies
entered  a  new  and  qualitatively  different  phase.  The  fluctuating,  but,  overall,
downward trend in the price of raw materials, including - for most of the period - oil,
on  which  these societies depend,  speeded  up  the widening  of inequality  in  social,
economic  and  cultural  development;  the  accumulation  of  foreign  debt;  and  the
increasing  inability  of such states to control  and  restrain  the spiralling  crises they
have to confront.
A modern phenomenon
The ‘revolutionary Islamic movement’ is a contemporary phenomenon. Whatever may
be the indirect or minor inﬂuences of past Islamic movements on it, it is attached by an
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umbilical  cord  to the form of world  capitalism that  has developed in  the last  three
decades.  The  social  roots  of  the  ‘political  Islamic  movements’  are,  essentially,  the
uprooted – those who, for a variety of reasons, have been waylaid on the path of socio-
economic development; and, to whom the new structures have brought nothing but
bankruptcies  and  ruin.  Despite  variations  in  its  social  fabric  in  diﬀerent
circumstances, the pan-Islamist movement in all the more-or-less developed countries
of the periphery (with a few exceptions) has recruited among four main layers.
First are the urban uprooted and deprived. They belong to the explosion of people with
no stable  relation  to  the  expanding  peripheral-capitalist  system of production  and
distribution.  These apparently  ‘cursed’  people have in  common a peasant  ancestry,
taking  ‘refuge’  in  the dirt  and  mud  surrounding  such  cities as Cairo,  Algiers,  and
Teheran. They are futureless, hopeless, degraded, and without identity or rights. In
Islamic societies, the urban destitute form the social layer most ready to take up the
Islamists’  banner.  They  make  up  the  main  social  base  for  the  ‘political  Islamic
movement.’ They also generate its explosive power.
Second  are  middle  layers  belonging  to pre-capitalist  structures.  Such  people  have
been bankrupted or marginalised by the spread of capitalist structures and their fate is
to struggle harder only to sink into greater poverty. They are important in helping to
organise  the  Islamic  movements,  and  in  welding  together  their  socially  disparate
supporters.
The third  layer  comprises sections of the merchant  and  industrial  bourgeoisie  left
outside  the  circle  of  power.  They  find  themselves  in  unequal  competition  with  a
bourgeoisie privileged by being close to (and reliant on) a state, the rationale of which
has been to orchestrate development from above.  In  peripheral  societies where the
bourgeois state (rather than being the product of capitalist development) imposes the
growth of capitalism from above - and where the relation between power and capital is
turned upside down to the extent that it is easier to rely on power to make money than
on wealth as a gateway to power - those layers of the bourgeoisie excluded from power
can count on being permanent losers. This fate places manufacturers and merchants in
the same camp as the ‘wretched of the earth.’ Such people not only ﬁll the coﬀers of
the Islamic movement,  but can also,  for  a period, help to increase the attraction of
pan-Islamism to  the  justice-seeking  poor  by  setting  up  charities,  interest-free  loan
accounts and other such schemes.
Fourth  are  intellectuals  whose  social  standing  has  declined,  who  have  lost  out,
altogether or at least to some degree, during the formation of the new political and
civil structures. These intellectuals find their influence and privileges vanishing. They
are increasingly isolated. Whether or not in priestly clothes,  whether young or old,
whether or  not -  objectively  -  their  re-emergence would answer a structural  need,
they will use the religious movement to re-establish their place in society. They provide
the leadership cadres of the movement, those who pack the ideological baggage and
map the political strategy for the ‘Islamic movement.’
Anti-enlightenment
The pan-Islamist  movement,  in  its rebellion  against  the hopelessness capitalism has
engendered, rests on the rejection of enlightenment. The ideologists of this rebellion
have to close their eyes to the future, turn their backs on reality and take refuge in
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myths. This obscurantism, ironically, brings today’s uprooted poor together, under one
umbrella, with yesterday’s rich. It is an Islam based on resurrecting, from a vast store
of  stories  and  myths,  ideas  that  promise  the  end  of  misery  for  all  those  on  the
scrapheap. It insists there is no alternative to a movement that is foreign to common
sense and free thought in all its forms. It treats as enemies all who favour scientiﬁc
thought and who question the so-called ‘certainties’ (tashkik). In this view any attempt
at enlightenment, whether of yesterday or today, is a devilish plot to be fought at all
costs.
Against class-based line-ups
The  pan-Islamist  movement  is  a  furnace  in  which  class  line-ups  must  melt.  The
non-homogeneous (multi-class) mix in the Islamists’ camp dictates a policy of denying
class war, or at least marginalising it and removing it from the immediate agenda. Such
a non-class-based social bloc, based on religious cultural  unity,  has no other way of
surmounting the class antagonisms within it between the hungry and those with full
bellies. Here and there, ‘the war between poverty and wealth’ becomes a weapon for
the movement to browbeat its merchant fellow-travellers when they become restless, or
to loosen their  purse strings.  But in general,  sharia’a remains ﬁrmly on the side of
‘unity’  and  those who ‘split’  (monafegh)  are worse than those who do not  ‘believe’
(moshrek). It has an uncompromising enmity towards communism or any other political
creed which deﬁnes society by its class boundaries and perceives class confrontations
as inevitable.
No national boundaries
At  every  level  the new ‘Islamic  movement’  is the rising  of those who not  only  see
themselves as alienated within their own national boundaries, but also of those who
have (they think)  discovered the source of their  destitution and bankruptcy outside
these boundaries. From their beginnings, therefore, these movements face outwards.
The foreign enemy is seen as the root cause of all evil; in creating the mechanisms of
depravity and misery, it ensures that all Muslims suffer injustice equally.
‘Political Islam’, accordingly, cannot conﬁne itself within national boundaries. To aspire
to set  up  anything  less than a world  Islamic  power,  based  on a world  Islamic  will,
would be to acknowledge ultimate defeat. This is the logic behind the rejection of the
legitimacy of all  the civil  and secular  systems that  sustain  nation states,  and of all
international  treaties and  agreements between  nation  states.  It  is  the context  that
explains  the  inherent  contradiction  involved  in  simultaneously  opposing  both
imperialism and world ‘arrogance’, and also nationalism. The Islamic movement may
here and there support tendencies aiming at independence and even isolationism. Yet
it is emphatic in its rejection of nationalisms that counterpose the nation against the
umma (Islamic community).
Anti-democratic
The pan-Islamist movement - however its elements interpret ‘political Islam’ - opposes
democracy  in  all  its  forms.  The  movement’s  beliefs,  class  make-up  and  historic
direction come together to reject popular sovereignty and the right of the people to
determine  their  own  destiny  by  majority  vote.  It  is  forced  to  locate  the  right  of
sovereignty above the heads of ordinary people, to make it the overarching authority
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that must resolve the movement’s internal  and external  contradictions.  Divine rule,
where all  rights belong to god,  is the only  realm where there are no tensions and
dissent. And it is only the divine that can give away this or that right on earth to the
chosen people - whether the Islamists in question wear clerical or civilian apparel.
Who is invested with this divine gift? This is a matter the ‘chosen’ must settle amongst
themselves. The right of people to vote on a one-person-one-vote basis can, at best,
only be accepted once.  This is in  regard to the initial  decision – for  or against the
Islamic Republic. Thereafter, the only political function of the people is to express their
allegiance (beia’a) to the chosen (nokhbegan).
Democracy  is an  institutional  mechanism to establish  a legal  basis for  government.
Islam, however, recognises only particular personages - a governor, vali or caliph: it
does not recognize institutions of government. Yet, in practice, it must institutionalise
the right to make decisions by a small coterie of nokhbegan and religious authorities
(mujtahed) - i.e. those who have the ability and ‘knowledge’ to interpret divine law for
any given circumstance. Recognition of those who have this ability is also in the hands
of those  who have  proven  their  ‘knowledge’  beforehand.  Thus  the  question  -“who
decides?” - comes full circle.
Citizen rights
Even  outside  the  question  of  political  power  and  of  government,  the  pan-Islamist
movement cannot accept any rights for its citizens. And, even if we put aside the fact
that  Islamic  sharia’a considers women as half a man (a destiny  considered  entirely
compatible with ‘justice’),  women will  do little better in the utopia that the Islamic
movement is advocating. The sanctity of the family is basic to the reconstruction of this
‘paradise  lost’,  and  the  values  cementing  it  together  require  an  unambiguous
deﬁnition of a woman – one that begins with her as a wife and ends with her as a
mother.
Outside  the  Islamic  framework lies  the  world  of corruption.  No matter  how much
political  Islam shouts about human rights and the miracle of womanhood, it  cannot
acknowledge values which cross the boundary into this world. Sometimes this or that
religion may be favoured for political purposes, so that its adherents may be aﬀorded a
status  equivalent  to  Muslims.  But  for  the  most  part  non-muslims  are  second-class
citizens or worse. Those who belong to proscribed religions, such as the Baha'i, are
directed to repent or die. If today religious apartheid is put on the shelf, tomorrow the
conscience of a powerful and dominant Islam will not rest until the non-Muslims ﬁnd
their ‘rightful’ position. If non-Muslims are today exempt from paying the religious tax
(jezzieh), they will only have this added to future debts.
In sum, the sovereignty of the people is a concept alien to the pan-Islamism movement,
which, most ominously, will actively seek to destroy it altogether.
Jihad and terrorism
The pan-Islamism movement is a ‘Jihad.’ The uprooted who decide that a ‘wheel that
does not turn for their needs should never turn’, and who do not see any reason to
decry the ruination of today if it leads to the utopia of tomorrow, can have no other
recourse but to the sword. No open and free environment, no democratic system, no
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legal  testament  can  guarantee  their  goal.  Even  if  pan-Islamism  can,  in  some
circumstances, gain power through legal means; whether or not it  is suppressed or
allowed to grow; whatever its place in a particular balance of power: it has in general
entered an arena of war where pulling the trigger is a daily duty. Recourse to terrorism
in all its forms; the semi-military organisation of that part of the social base that can be
mobilised; the creation of professional military institutions; attempts to inﬁltrate and
recruit in the armies of Islamic countries: these are all acts which cannot be stopped or
even delayed. Jihad is a road which will take pan-Islamism to the promised land.
The  growing  crisis  and  the  steady  weakening  of  governments  increased  the
intervention of global capital in the internal affairs of Islamic countries. This process
reached  a  point  at  which  the  finance  and  economic  ministries  of  many  Islamic
countries turned into impotent  operatives for  the decision-making  centres of global
capital. They bowed to major and crisis-provoking restructuring of the socio-political
life of their countries. They presided over policies that caused massive unemployment
and  attendant  despair;  chronic  inflation  ravaging  meagre  savings;  acute  housing
shortages leading to running battles between the guardians of the city and the never-
ending  waves  of  migrants;  and  non-existent  healthcare  facilities  that  transform
hospitals effectively into morgues.
The savage demands of the International  Monetary  Fund and  the credit  limitations
imposed  by  the  World  Bank,  forced  peripheral  governments  to  turn  on  their  own
people.  What  little  remained  of state  largesse,  in  the  form of subsidies,  dried  up.
Millions were made destitute, unprotected against misery, famine and disease. These
were the people who carried Egyptian, Tunisian, Moroccan and Algerian pan-Islamism
on  their  shoulders.  The scholars of Islam would  do better  -  and  would  save their
institutions  (official  and  unofficial)  much  money  -  if,  instead  of  looking  for  the
footprints of political Islam in history, they would wend their way to the archives of the
IMF and its financial networks. There they would find the directives that cast light on
the cause of the plight of their people.
Crisis of political hegemony
The  centre-periphery  crisis  of  capitalism is  the  prerequisite  for  unrest  and  mass
uprisings in Islamic societies. But that general crisis cannot of itself direct the revolt
organically in a particular way, whether towards pan-Islamism or, perhaps, progress
and socialism. Without a particular set of circumstances in the political and ideological
sphere, and in the arena of class conflict and social relations, pan-Islamism would not
have  been  able  to  grow  into  a  broad  mass  movement.  An  understanding  of  the
distinctive features of those circumstances involves analysis of a particular  crisis of
political hegemony within the framework of a general crisis of ideology. To begin from
basics,  this  would  necessitate  a  rounded  discussion  of the  particular  way  politico-
ideological  structures in  peripheral  societies grow. This is beyond the scope of the
argument here, but a few reminders may be useful.
First,  although  in  the majority  of societies under  discussion  the capitalist  mode of
production dominates, the bourgeoisie has not fully developed as the hegemonic class.
The immaturity of the bourgeoisie in these social  formations shows itself best in  its
anaemic political and ideological personality. For this reason, the dominant ideology,
the prime requirement of which is the securing of the voluntary assent of the masses to
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the existing social order, at best contains only elements of bourgeois thinking. It  is
made up of an amalgam of nationalism, religious dogma, elements of petit-bourgeois
ideas, paternalistic and tribal values, along with some aspects of liberalism.
Second, the acceleration of structural changes very quickly upsets the class-political
line-ups  and  in  uniquely  new  divisions  and  allegiances.  The  ruling  ideological
amalgam, discussed above, is not only incapable of fulfilling the task of gaining the
assent of the masses, but also loses its effectiveness even within the ruling bloc. Not
surprisingly, therefore, any attempt to remodel and renew this doctrine has the effect
of reducing further its influence on one section of society just as it appears to increase
its capacity to influence other sectors. In other words, the more it becomes aware of
the  need  to update  its  ideology,  the  more the  bourgeosie  both  loses its  ability  to
universalize its essential ideology and, paradoxically, provokes confrontations amongst
the subordinate ideological trends.
Third, the end result of such a process, especially if it coincides with a major collapse
of the government’s economic programmes, appears in the form of multi-dimensional
changes in the various political structures. Inside the ruling bloc the crisis surfaces as
one of hegemony, which not only causes a series of changes in the balance of power,
but also often leads the purging of -  or even a bloody suppression of -  some of the
ruling factions. This, in turn, reduces more than ever the hegemonic political influence
of the ruling bloc on the masses, diminishing its social base even further.
But at the opposite pole, the working class is powerless not only because of its relative
youth and political immaturity but also because it lacks an eﬀective ideological base.
The ‘Marxism-Leninism’ packaged in the ‘Academies of Science’ of the ‘socialist bloc’,
in conjunction with various theories of the ‘non-capitalist road to socialism’, in no way
served to unite the working class. Quite the opposite. These theories rationalized the
splitting  of  the  political  and  trade-union  movement  into  small  groupings,  and  the
collapse  of  other  sections  of  workers  into  passivity  or  open  surrender.  In  some
countries the communist and worker parties went as far as liquidating themselves and
amalgamating with the ruling party (e.g. in Egypt). In others, there was an inexorable
process distancing the mass of workers from worker-based political organisations.
To complete the picture, there was systematic police repression. Taken together, all
this explains why, at a time when conditions for the growth of the class pole opposing
the  bourgeoisie  were  at  their  best,  the  working  class  remained  weaker  and  more
helpless than  ever.  This catastrophic  balance between  the two main  class poles in
society  promoted  not  so  much  political  paralysis  as  a  vacuum –  both  of  political
representation and of legitimacy. In such situations the voice from the minarets gains
an ear.  A  multicoloured amalgam of social  layers is attracted by the invitation to a
jihad,  apparently  taking  its  ideology  from ancient  tales  and  sayings,  but  actually
resurrected on the ruins, chaos and wretchedness of today. 
 
 
Facilitating factors
We have argued, then that the current conjuncture of political and economic crises
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provides  the  necessary  pre-conditions  for  the  mass  pan-Islamist  movement  in
peripheral  Islamic  societies.  But  this  is  not  the  full  explanation  for  the  explosive
growth  of  this  phenomenon.  To  understand  how  pan-Islamism  is  a  credible
government-in-waiting in a number of counties, and indeed, has taken over power in
some, we must consider a number of facilitating factors:
First is the presence of an official religious establishment with a network of mosques
and schools; an abundance of paid cadres; firm roots, to some extent independent of
state power; the ability to be in direct daily contact with people; and finally certain
legal  and  political  immunities,  and  numerous social  and  legal  privileges.  Whatever
control  is  exerted  on  the  official  religious  establishment,  it  remains  the  main
ideological arsenal and the durable political background of pan-Islamism.
Second, we must consider the ruling political administrations’ attitude to religion. In
most  Islamic  countries,  despite  the  gradual  separation  between  the  state  and  the
religious structures - and all the ups and downs in the relations between them - some
form of working alliance has always been maintained. The prime purpose of this has
been  to oppose the  left  and  the workers’  movement.  At  every  juncture where the
workers and democratic movement have made advances, threatening the despotic and
authoritarian systems, the religious apparatus has joined the army and police as an
arm of repression.  In  return,  from time to time,  the state has acted  to spread  the
network of religious schools and mosques; to facilitate the establishment of workplace
and  neighbourhood  Islamic  societies;  and  to  promote  the  religious  establishment’s
political  inﬂuence  by  means  of  cultural,  devotional,  and  charitable  organisations.
Finally  -  in  conditions  of  a  single-party  state  -  there  has  been  toleration  of  the
quasi-party  activity  of  religious  fractions  inside  the  ruling  party  and  government.
Without a serious analysis of the role of the state in Islamic countries,  and without
considering the relations between religion and state,  it  is impossible to understand
how  Islamic  societies  became  so  defenceless  in  the  face  of  growing  religious
obscurantism and backward-looking political movements.
The third factor is the effect of imperialist policy during the Cold War. Throughout it,
one of the major  weapons of imperialist  powers against  liberation  movements (and
movements  for  freedom and  socialism)  in  Islamic  countries  was  religion.  In  using
religion  to  stupefy  the  masses  and  to  denounce  opposition,  imperialism was  both
resourceful and relentless. It used the religious weapon (through groups, parties and
men  of  influence)  to  provoke  splits  in  the  working-class  movement,  sabotage
progressive  and  nationalist  movements,  and  even  to  destabilise  anti-imperialist
governments or those allied with Soviet Union.
An incomplete list might include the following. First, the assistance given to the rise of
Ekhvane Muslemin (Muslim Brotherhood) against Nasser’s regime in Egypt and the
Ba’ath  Party  in  Syria.  Second,  support  for  the  Islamic  Amal  in  Lebanon  as  a
counterweight  to  the  Palestine  Liberation  Organisation  and  progressive  Lebanese
leaders and  parties.  Third,  the strengthening  of the Fadaiyan-e Islam,  and  mullahs
such as Ayatollah Kashani, in opposition to Dr Mossadegh’s government and the Tudeh
(Communist)  Party  in  Iran.  Fourth,  the  massacre  of  half  a  million  communists  in
Indonesia.  Fifth,  the  mobilisation  of  semi-military  parties  and  organisations  in
Afghanistan and the provision of unlimited support to their eﬀorts to overthrow the
Marxist  government.  In  so using religion,  the imperialist  intelligence networks may
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rely on facilities provided by countries such as Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, or on their
own agents sent directly, to create or to inﬁltrate religious groupings or parties. Their
support can take diﬀerent forms, but the important point is that they played a central
Cold War role in increasing Islamic religious inﬂuence in Islamic societies. We see the
grave consequences today.
The fourth point is the effect of regional political crises on the overall growth of the
pan-Islamist movement. The deadlock in Arab-Israeli relations in general - embracing
the questions of Palestine; the occupation of Lebanese, Syrian and Jordanian land; and
the  persistence  of military  mobilisation  and  sporadic  military  confrontations  -  has
aided  the  pan-Islamist  movement.  Nothing  damages  the  standing  of  secular  Arab
nationalism more  than  the  humiliation  of  Arab  governments  by  Israel.  The  blind
‘non-conciliatory’ attitude of pan-Islamism when confronting ‘Jews’ seems well justiﬁed
by the Camp David Accord and by other such retreats - the most recent of which is the
creation of minuscule bantustans as a sop to Palestinian nationalism. Faced with the
task of untying these religious knots, left and progressive forces have shown chronic
weakness. This is the background to the way in which events such as the assassination
of  Sadat,  the  blowing  up  of  US  and  French  marine  headquarters  in  Beirut,  and,
perhaps most critically, the Intifada itself, have become turning points. While the basic
crisis remains unsolved, the pan-Islamist movement will  continue to fill  the political
vacuum.
A ﬁfth facilitating factor was the Iranian revolution of 1979. The coming to power of
the ﬁrst Islamic government to place pan-Islamism at the centre of its political  and
ideological agenda was crucial in the spread of ‘political Islam.’ Nor could the Iranian
government remain even momentarily content with exercising indirect inﬂuences on
the Islamist movements. From the beginning it did whatever it could to inﬂuence them
directly  and  take over  their  leadership.  All  the Islamic  movements were supported
ﬁnancially, logistically and by military training. Many groups and organisations were
overhauled.  Where  necessary,  the  Iranian  regime called  on  radical  factions  within
Islamic organisations to split. It involved itself in an extensive organisation of terrorist
and  jihad-like  cells,  and  embarked  on  an  intensive  drive  to  shape  an  Islamic
international.  Finally,  it  pursued  an  eight-year  war  with  Iraq  which  was,  above all,
concerned with the ‘export of the revolution’ by military means.
The  Islamic  Republic  of  Iran  is  not  alone  today  in  ‘exporting  the  pan-Islamist
movement.’ Other states, such as Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, are also actively making a
bid to take over the leadership of the Islamist movement, to inﬂuence its policies and to
spread religious illusions and superstitions.
Sixth, we must consider the eﬀect of the collapse of the Soviet Union and, especially,
the  coming  of  Bush’s  ‘New World  Order’,  the  after-eﬀects  of  which  will,  for  the
foreseeable future, feed blind radicalism and militant ‘anti-imperialist’ - the Islamists
prefer  the term estekbar  (loosely  translated  as ‘arrogance’)  to ‘imperialism.’  In  the
conditions we have been outlining, legitimacy for pan-Islamist and similar movements
comes when the prevailing gunboat diplomacy, and outright colonialist policies, of the
USA and its allies, turns them into movements for gaining identity, prestige and pride.
In devastating the kindergartens and hospitals of Iraq, US and Allied planes lined up
many millions of the downtrodden masses behind the Omar Abdel-Rahmans and Ali
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Belhajs of this world. The spokes people of world imperialism cannot claim innocence
as they  denounce the dangers of ‘Islamic  fundamentalism’  and  warn  of ‘fanaticism’
endangering  the security  and  stability  of world  civilisation.  They  know better  than
anyone that the global capitalist system has itself created the conditions for Islamic
fundamentalism and  fanaticism.  They  are  the  agents  of  another  of  history’s  ironic
twists, through which the third industrial revolution has attached a backward-looking
child to the maternal skirts of capitalism.
How is society affected?
The effect of all this is to grind away at the potential for class action, for democratic
movements, and for cultural advance, as society becomes increasingly polarized and, at
the bottom,  destitute -  as it  faces grave psycho-social  problems.  From economy to
politics, science and culture, wherever Pan-Islamism treads, it leaves a trail of conflict,
contradiction and crisis. Its ruinous effects on secular life vary in extent and breadth
at  different  stages of its development,  and  may at  times even be self-negating,  but
there is a recognizable pattern to its development. We turn now to review this, first in
conditions where the movement is in opposition, then when it gains political power.
Political Islam in opposition
Political Islam splits civil society at every level while leaving state structures intact.
In the first instance every type of class organisation, institution, political party, trade
union and guild is split in half along confrontational religious lines. Islamic labour and
peasant  unions and  guilds stand  opposed  to their  non-Islamic  equivalents.  Nothing
escapes this split, not even bourgeois class organisations and societies. Fissured into
Islamic  and  non-Islamic  categories,  the  sub-groups  glare  at  each  other  across  an
ideological divide that causes major transformation in the social class line-up. New -
fundamentally non-class - blocs are formed. Labour-power lines up with either ‘Islamic’
and ‘secular’  capital  under the umbrellas of ‘Islam’ and ‘secularism.’  Meanwhile,  in
society  beyond  the  state,  an  embryonic  form of Bonapartism emerges,  oﬀering  an
alternative  future  state  formation.  The  potential  for  progressive  class  action  is
systematically eroded.
Democratic erosion
Simultaneously  democratic  structures  and  institutions  are  similarly  split:  the
ideological weapon creates Muslim societies of doctors, lawyers, engineers, teachers,
students, or women - distinct from non-Muslim groupings. The Muslim doctors can no
longer  defend  their  professional  needs alongside  non-Muslim doctors.  Worse,  their
duty to combat atheism and blasphemy overtakes every other duty.
Civil  society  is  fractured  into  the  Islamic  and  non-Islamic:  the  divide  rips  apart
everything from trade unions to professional organisations. This is the most profound
and dangerous consequence of the pan-Islamic movement. It mobilises one section of
society against another. This division even appears in some industries in core capitalist
countries. The inevitable and tragic effect is to create artificial alliances throughout
society, on the basis of sex, religion or ethnicity. Woman is set against woman, teacher
against teacher, worker against worker.
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Where Muslim women organise separately from other women, not only do they enfeeble
the women’s movement in its struggle for democratic rights, they even compromise its
ability to hang on to past achievements. We see the tragic sight of a woman who has
lost  all  rights voluntarily  saying  ‘yes’  to her  slavery.  All  this  faces the democratic
movement with its greatest dilemma. As its potential is eroded, a territory is created
where the seeds of a future religious despotism are planted.
Paradoxically,  the more the masses occupy  the stage the greater  the power  of the
leadership. Indeed there is an inverse relationship between representation and mass
mobilisation. The leadership of these movements feed on mass activity.  Their  power
becomes more concentrated and unassailable in direct relation to their ability to bring
the  masses  on  to  the  political  scene.  The  appearance  of  the  masses,  in  these
circumstances, signals not the exercise of their collective will but rather their political
disrobement. Where the masses are reduced to the umma (family of believers) of the
iman - where, in its ideal form, they are the disciples of religious authorities (marja’a),
then the more they  make their  presence felt  in  the political  arena,  the greater  the
authority  of the  leaders,  imams and  clergy.  The  role  of  an  individual  with  his/her
democratic  rights in society,  and the state,  fades. The democratic  base of society is
weakened. The roots of future religious despotism are established and foundations of
an ultra-centralized, leader-focused political structure are laid.
Cultural fatigue
In a society giving birth to a radical Islamic movement, the cultural make-up is the first
victim.  The  cultural  sphere  disintegrates  into  numerous  ever-smaller,  conflicting
formations, united only by belief in the absolute. This calamitous process effectively
closes  the  route  to  cultural  advance.  Scientific  thought,  experimental  sciences,
philosophy, as well as values emanating from these, are walled off by absolutist cultural
structures.  The  quest  for  the  absolute  -  the  struggle  to  annex  knowledge  to  an
integrated and dominant ideological monopoly - becomes the governing, social ethic.
In  addition  there  is  a  return  to  the  most  extreme  paternalism,  superstition  and
machismo, deepening the roots of the ideas that will ultimately create, and secure, the
ultra-conservative,  absolutist,  and  despotic  structures  of  the  Islamic  state.  In  this
process, not only is the value-system of society overturned, but cultural, educational
and ethical structures are overhauled. Muslim schools, Islamic social gatherings, and
so on, reappear. The intellectual potential of society is gradually eroded. Thought, in
all its manifestations is enslaved to belief and Islamic ethics. Sceptical questioning -
essential  to scientific  and philosophical  thought -  is rejected as a tool  of the devil.
Combine these pressures on independent thought with daily attacks on modernism and
everything new, and the elements of a sterile and rigid intellectual life are all in place.
Instead  we  have  a  situation  in  which  intellectual  servitude,  demagoguery  and
obscurantism can breed; and in which religious despotism can grow.
Social psychology
More insidiously  still,  the psychological  potential  of society  becomes poisoned,  and
with  disastrous  eﬀects.  A  corrosive  mixture  of  absolutism  and  power-worship,
juxtaposed  with  the placing  of a monopoly  belief at  the centre of the social  value-
system of a polarized society leads to a cult of violence. The ideological process numbs
islam http://www.critiquejournal.net/islam.html
10 of 23 03/12/10 14:37
the  senses,  creating  an  acceptance  of  a  militaristic,  police  mentality.  This  can  be
expressed as the exhortation to the violence of the jihad (holy war); as the amre be
ma’aruf (or  duty  to punish  those who do not  observe Islamic  laws);  as the cult  of
martyrdom and  the  ‘blood’  (witness  the  fountain  spewing  blood  in  the  ‘Martyrs’
Cemetery’  in  Teheran);  and  as  the  self-mutilation  associated  with  the  mourning  of
saints and martyrs. All these, and other things, create an atmosphere where acts of
violence and the shedding of blood become a social norm.
It is in this context that the deliberate burning of the Rex Cinema in Abadan by Muslim
revolutionaries,  which cost  600  people their  lives,  should  be seen.  Later,  came the
immolation of over thirty Turkish secular intellectuals in Sivas, and the kniﬁng to death
of Croatian workers in Algeria.  A culture is being created based on hatred of ‘other’
human beings. A mentality of mistrust, fear, tension, and friction permeates society’s
every cell. Hand in hand with this goes the culture of spying and prying into the life of
others at home, work, school and college. One section of society spends huge amounts
of time and  energy  reporting  the ‘misdeeds’  of the other.  The corruption  of family,
human, professional and other relations cannot be underestimated. It is indeed ironic
that  a religion  dedicated  to making  the family  the pillar  of society  rips family  ties
asunder by getting one member to interfere with, even spy on, another. A culture is
built on treachery.
There are other negative outcomes. The situation increases the power of the male, the
khan,  and  the  mullah;  leads  to  unquestioning  acceptance  of  received  wisdom;
encourages crude populism;  promotes the reduction  of difficult  concepts to  simple
absurdity;  and  creates  fertile  ground  for  the  rise  in  religiosity  and  belief  in  the
supernatural.  Ultimately  this leaves social  mistrust  and creates the basis for  future
ideological and police-military repressive institutions.
In power: the political sphere
Once pan-Islamism creates a state in which religion rules, its effect on the environment
is immeasurably  greater  and  longer-lasting.  Some of these effects will  undoubtedly
survive long after the Islamic regimes return to the grave from which they rose.
As we have seen the roots of what becomes the Islamic State are established before
political Islam comes to power. Fundamental changes in polarising society differently –
in class politics, in cultural and intellectual life, in social psychology and in the system
of social ethics – have already taken place. Ideological and political values that have
stubbornly survived for centuries are now co-opted into service. What we now see is, in
effect, an overwhelming tendency towards the abolition of the modern state -  to the
extent that its main indicator, its secular superstructure (the separation of politics and
ideology, especially religious ideology) comes under siege.
Sharia’a law displaces secular law. A system of law based on the parliamentary vote,
rationality and contemporary human needs is replaced by one held to be sacred and
eternal. A process is unleashed to overturn the general structures of political power,
giving the ideological institutions pivotal positions in the exercise of that power. The
traditional role of the state is overturned, and it is transformed from the mechanism for
the control of the country’s socio-economic tensions into the cause and perpetuator of
those tensions and social crises. The contradiction between a religious-ideological state
and  its  secular,  material,  rational  base  creates  a  situation  of  permanent  crisis.  A
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religious despotism is established in  which  the ruling  Islamic  power  creates a new
legal system, where the right to govern at every level (legislative and judicial) is held
to be divine -  exercised solely on god’s behalf by certain sections of the clergy. The
modern capitalist state’s formal equality of citizens before the law is abolished. It is
replaced  by  a legal  system where the ‘government  of the ruling  Ayatollahs’  stands
above, and in authority over, the masses.
In power: the enlarged and interventionist state structure
Three aspects of this greatly enlarged and more interventionist state structure must be
examined.
First, what in eﬀect happens is that civil society is more or less abolished. One part of
it is absorbed into the state itself, while the rest disappears. Underlying this process is
the  denial  of  the  independence  of  the  private  from  the  public  sphere.  Islamic
government recognises no such boundaries. No part of life is considered private and
outside the control  of divine rule,  and  that  of god’s representatives.  This totalising
conception underlies the need to bring the very concept of civil society to an end. The
sector reconstituted accepting the ruling ideology is organically incorporated into the
state. The sectors that persist in their secular existence are annulled.
Civilians are  mobilised  in  readily  available  gangs to attack bookshops or  dissident
groups -  the ‘mobilisation of the dispossessed’ (basij mostaz’aﬁn), involving millions.
Islamic societies are set up and Islamic Shoras (committees) of – for example – workers,
craftsmen, tradesmen, commercial people, are created around mosques, Hosseiniehs,
the institutions of Friday Prayer,  etc.  All  this allows the Islamic  state to spread its
tentacles into every home.
It is a rare trade organisation, cultural grouping or political gathering that can escape
this  fate.  The  paradox  of  complete  absorption  or  total  abolition  is  enacted  with
increasing  determination  and  force,  the  deeper  the  ruling  Islamic  regime digs  in.
Ultimately even those institutions to some extent independent of parties, trade unions,
etc.,  are  abolished,  or  at  least  transformed  into  appendages  of the  police-security
apparatus,  or  of the management  of the office or  enterprise.  The remnants of civil
society, in short, are militarised -  or vaticanised -  playing their role for the state in
policing or ideological control.
This  process  encourages  a  ballooning  of  bureaucracy;  reduced  productivity;
obstructionism; the multiplication of centres of power and of parallel institutions; and
corruption,  bribery  and  nepotism.  While state bureaucracy  is greatly  expanded,  its
power is paradoxically eroded. The greater the power of the state, the more ‘private’
that state becomes. Not only is the modern state abolished, the state that replaces it
becomes the representative not of the general interests of capital, but rather of the
particular interests of speciﬁc capitals.
The second phenomenon consequent on the new state structures is the depoliticisation
of the masses. Pan-Islamism in power politicises the whole of society and maintains it in
a state of constant mobilisation. One section of society imposes state control, the other
opposes  by  whatever  means  it  can.  Society  is  driven  in  two opposing  camps:  the
religious and the secular. Paradoxically, however, this permanent politicisation tends
to  create  its  own  opposite  -  through  exhaustion  comes  depoliticisation.  Once
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depoliticisation spreads to both camps in a society with an atomised class formation
and  political  base,  the  longer  term  potential  for  change  and  progress  towards
democracy is seriously weakened. The future for these societies is truly dark.
The third point to be commented on concerns the inequality of citizens before the law.
The equality of citizens forms the legal basis of the modern state. This too is negated in
Islamic  societies  where the interference of ideology  creates several  legal  layers in
society - for example, there are separate inheritance laws for men and for women; for
Muslims and for non-Muslims. Radical Islam creates citizens equal when it comes to
obeying laws but not when it comes to changing them. Man cannot reject laws that
have been divinely ordained (and as they have been interpreted by the mujtahed - the
learned mullah).
In power: the economy
Perhaps more than in any other ﬁeld, the rise to power of the pan-Islamist movement
brings the societies it  governs into conﬂict their own material infrastructure. If the
main role of the state in all societies, including Islamic peripheral countries, should be
to ‘recreate the external conditions for production’, the ‘Pan-Islamist state’ in practice
tends towards multi-dimensional  and  permanent  economic  crisis.  In  particular,  the
ideological  Islamic  state cannot  use to the full  the various levers with  which  most
states regulate the economy - the law, money and force.
To look at  all  three in  turn.  Ideology  weakens the use of the law,  one of the most
important interventionist tools in the hands of the state. The law’s rational, objective
elements become overshadowed by ideological and political considerations. As a result,
the  secular  and  ‘rational’  economic  sphere  constantly  ﬁnds  itself  in  opposition  to
(essentially ideological and irrational) law, and slips out of the latter’s control.
Ideology limits and obstructs the workings of the laws of capitalism too, including its
fundamental law of value. The equality of a commodity in exchange is eclipsed by its
inequality in ideology: the law of value is constrained or made conditional.  Hand in
hand  with  this  limitation  goes  a  certain  liberalism.  Ownership  is  valid  so  long  as
religious tax is paid and it  has been obtained by ‘legitimate’  (mashrou’)  means.  An
ideological element thus enters both into ownership and into the exchange of property.
A property used for un-Islamic purposes (e.g., brewing) or for which religious tax has
not been paid is illegitimate and cannot be exchanged. Commerce is also aﬀected by
ideology (some commodities, such as alcohol, ‘immoral’ literature or ﬁlms, videos, many
articles of clothing, etc, cannot be bought or sold).
On the question of money. This vital lever of state intervention in the economy faces a
similar fate. Money essentially loses its function to fulfil the needs of production and
circulation. Instead, the religious-ideological state uses money to answer its political
and ideological needs. The volume of money in circulation is allowed to expand at an
uncontrolled  rate  -  dictated  by  political  considerations.  Consequently  the  money
supply is no longer a stabilising but an anarchic element in the economy. This process
allows huge quantities of money to accumulate in a few private hands, creating equity
that then confronts the state, vitiating its control, and even determining its actions. As
in  the  case  of  the  law,  money  is  used  to  offset  the  contradictions  between  the
ideological state and its material-economic base; and in the process comes to function
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as its own antithesis - destabilising rather than stabilising the economy.
As  to  the  use  of  force,  its  function  in  a  Radical  Islamic  government  as  a  purely
repressive tool is even more obvious in the economic sphere than in others. Force is
not  deployed  as it  is  in  a ‘normal’  capitalist  state -  to suppress the conflicts  and
contradictions between the various sectors of the economy, and to paper over cracks so
that  conditions for  the reproduction  of capital  are optimized.  Instead,  it  is used  to
suppress the conflicts and contradictions between the economy as a whole and the
ruling  political  power.  The  use  of force,  whether  material  or  ideological  -  that  is
whether taking the form of expropriation, legal suspension, fines, imprisonment, etc, or
of denunciation as diabolic and un-Islamic from the pulpit – has one consequence: it
creates massive insecurity in the economic realm.
The result is the creation of a complex web of non-economic structures, entwined with
a parasitic and unaccountable structure of capital. A powerful defensive perimeter is
then  built  around  this  alliance  protecting  it  against  both  the  ideological-material
coercion of the state and against blind economic forces. This huge maﬁa-like structure
has, at one extremity, the ‘bazaar’ and the mosques, and, at the other, the armed forces
and the religious courts. Such is the inevitable fate of societies unfortunate enough to
live under a pan-Islamist regime.
There are further  effects of pan-Islamic  rule on  the economy,  which  go beyond  its
enfeebling the state and which have even more direct effects on the potential of these
societies for economic development. We need to look at investment, human resources,
the labour code, and science and technology.
In  these  societies,  both  internal  and  external  capital  fights  shy  of  investment  in
long-term projects. Domestic investment is discouraged by the fall in the rate of capital
accumulation.  One factor  in  this is the expansion of an interfering,  totalitarian and
highly expensive state. A huge burden is placed on the gross domestic product and
value-adding activities, which hinders the possibilities of capital accumulation in line
with developmental needs. The impact on the state sector is decisive and disastrous.
The effect on the private sector is less, but considerable, leading it essentially to shun
investment in productive industries. It is affected by the prevailing insecurity brought
about by the ideological-political policies we have discussed. Instead, capital is drawn
into quick-return transactions. It  also tends towards less accountable areas. All  this
means that the private sector, prompted both by the most efficient pursuit of profit and
by non-economic considerations, tends to eschew productive investment in favour of
playing the stock market, hoarding, speculation, buying and selling, real estate and
land transactions, and so on.
Meanwhile, general economic conditions mean that the ability of the state sector to
invest  in  vital  parts  of  the  economy  is  also  progressively  eroded.  Sectors  of  the
economy  dependent  -  because of low profitability  or  poor  development  -  on  state
investment therefore also fare badly. Increasing inequalities and imbalance is caused
in  an  economy already  suffering  the uneven  development  of a peripheral  capitalist
economy.
Foreign  sources  of  investment  are  even  less  likely  to  respond.  In  addition  to  the
economic factors we have discussed are political factors,  amongst them an insecure
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legal-judicial atmosphere, and Radical Islam’s adventurist foreign policy. And there is a
further  element:  the  deliberate  use  of  the  economic  weapon,  including  oﬃcial
sanctions, by core capitalist countries to control crisis-provoking Islamic governments
acts  as`a barrier  to the entry  of international  ﬁnance into these countries.  Where
investment does take place, it is highly calculated and of a politico-economic nature.
Thus  Japan  and  Italy  have  tried  to  ensure  their  future  supplies  of  oil  in  Iran  by
investing in petrochemicals or other strategic goods. But even here, where they are
securing their supplies against present and future rivals, advance payment has been
extracted in the form of oil sales, itself fulﬁlling the need to secure oil stockpiles.
On human resources: this most  vital  of all  factors in  economic  development  is also
exhausted under Radical Islamic governments.  The productivity of manpower under
capitalism is intricately  linked with  skill  levels,  education,  research,  etc.  A  secular,
scientific and experimental environment encourages their development which in turn
serves to refresh that environment. But the Islamic government crushes this through
the pressure it brings to bear on secular life (including schools, universities, scientific
and research centres). The regime confronts science with belief (maktab). Its ceaseless
interference in secular life even forces many of those who already have skills to flee the
country or to abandon productive economic activity. The Islamic state thus not only
fails to recreate a qualitatively advanced workforce, but deskills the existing labour
force,  hampering  the ability  of the economy to expand.  Nor  does this environment
attract foreign workers of sufficient calibre, who also have to cope with limitations on
foreign exchange.
In Islam it is not the function of the state to regulate labour through a labour code. The
usual legal framework designed to deliver a labour force that is not unduly worn out is
thus absent. The equal exchange of labour power is replaced by the law of ‘rental’ of
labour where the contract is between the individual and the owner without regulatory
intervention. Where a labour code has been legislated, as in Iran in 1992, it has been
under intense pressure from workers, and after great procrastination.
Science and technology is an essential  ingredient of economic development,  but,  in
radical Islam, this too succumbs to the blows of ideological control, especially at the
university and technical college level. The return to the amalgamation of religion and
the state prevents the flowering of science. The potential for domestic technological
development is at best confined to selected areas. Foreign technology is also largely
inaccessible for  political  and  foreign-exchange reasons.  Moreover,  the absence of a
sufficiently  advanced  domestic  technical  skills-base  limits  the  potential  benefits  of
imported technology. So the result is to deny society one more key lever for economic
development.
In  short,  Pan-Islamism  in  power  is  ruinous  for  the  economy.  Though  retaining
capitalism as the dominant mode of production, capitalist development is slowed down
in  certain  fields  without  being  able  to  resurrect  some  pre-capitalist  forms  of
production.  Thus  the  inherited  multi-structured  economy  (containing  elements  of
pre-capitalist  economy in the midst of a dominant capitalist  economy)  is faced both
with  paralysing  contradictions and internal  anarchy; and  with  the existent  unequal
development  of  international  capitalism,  now  accentuated  to  breaking  point.  The
peripheral  economy,  as  it  comes under  Islamic  rule,  cannot  escape  the  additional
disruption  involved  in  its  now-fractured  relationship  to  the  core  countries  -  a
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relationship crucial for the external reproduction of capital that is so vital for such an
economy.  The  net  result  is  to  push  the  economy  into  reverse;  wear  down  the
superstructure and infrastructure of the economy; dry up the economic resources and
future potential; and finally mortgage not only the present but also the prospects for a
recovery. Pan-Islamism in power creates the conditions for the Islamic societies to sink
in a sea of poverty and destitution.
In power: culture, social psychology and social atomization
In  the sphere of social  psychology,  all  those elements in  Radical  Islam that,  before
achieves power, have already begun to transform the system of values, the intellectual
structures, and the cultural face of society now come into their own. The two opposing
cultural camps, each reacting to the other and rapidly moving towards the extreme in
their  positions,  define  themselves  as  the  negation  of  the  other.  Each  camp  -  the
Pan-Islamist  counterposed  to those against  Radical  Islam,  the religious against  the
irreligious or even anti-religious - creates its own separate systems based on absolute
values.
Anyone not a fervent believer in Radical Islam is a heathen and a devil. Conversely, any
Muslim is a murderer, oppressor, plotter, etc. While one camp looks on the exposure of
a few strands of a woman’s hair as prostitution, the other denounces any attempt at
deﬁning morals in private and sexual life as fanaticism and backwardness. In practice,
this process manifests itself as a strange whirlpool of false pretensions to religiosity,
institutionalised  hypocrisy,  nihilism  and  immorality,  pulling  equally  in  opposite
directions.
A  further  feature  of  this  tragic  cultural  transformation  is  the  way  it  acquires  a
repressive  police  function.  The  culture  of  Radical  Islam,  in  becoming  the  oﬃcial
culture,  is  absorbed  into the political  structures of the state.  Non-Islamist  culture
enters the realm of the forbidden as a ‘anti-culture’,  a ‘cultural  enemy’,  a ‘cultural
danger’ and ‘cultural corruption.’ It is unceremoniously removed to the realm of the
forbidden.  Both  cultural  trends  -  the  Pan-Islamic  and  its  counterpoint  -  become
completely subordinate to ideology in a process that follows an almost inevitable path
towards an atomised society.
The faster  the oﬃcial  culture takes shape,  the more it  is equipped with  repressive
tools. The greater is the absorption of ideological structures into the state, the greater
is their control of cultural life. The more education becomes part of the ruling religion,
the  faster  the  news  media  become  schools  of  indoctrination,  entirely  lacking  in
diversity. In short, secular life comes under increasing ideological control and greater
pressure.  And  the  opposite  is  true  too.  Social  opposition,  reactions  of  discontent,
criticism  take  the  form  of  ‘cultural  attack’  and  ‘cultural  confrontation.’  Culture
becomes totally politicised.
In the absence of a political opposition with any influence, popular protest is either
explosive (this is the usual  form it  takes)  or  it  manifests itself in  an individual  and
atomised cultural form. There develops both an open and an underground war over
everyday-life  issues.  There  are  major  conflicts  in  which,  using  primitive  weapons,
opponents of the ruling culture mock its many manifestations -  the dress code, the
‘pagan’ national festivals that provoke street battles, the duality of home and public life
and morality. Scratch the surface of a Radical Islamic society and you will witness its
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antithesis deeply permeating its every aspect. The irony is that Radical Islam, which
emerged as a movement for ‘cultural revolution’, ﬁnds itself surrounded by a ‘counter-
cultural revolution.’  History mocks the very imams who are the epitome of absolute
power by having them humiliated in running battles with rebellious ‘youth.’ The ruling
mullahs are forced to admit that the cultural assault by the ‘enemy’ (read: the young
who have known nothing but the Islamic regime) is the greatest danger they and the
‘Islamic revolution’ face.
Opposition atomised: the challenge for the left
But there is a danger signal here for progressive forces too. This backward turn in the
social struggle, from one which is conscious, and organised on political lines, into an
atomised, individual, absolutist, cultural battle, without clear class aims and lacking
any real political consciousness, simultaneously wears down the cultural potential of
Islamic societies and drains them of political health. The sad reality is that even when
the  religious-Islamist  governments  are  overthrown,  the  future  looks  bleak.  What
progressive and stable socio-political system can take root in a society mired in uneven
development,  polarized  and  depoliticised,  where  public  discourse  is  populist  or
demagogic? Social  and  moral  indifference,  negativism and  nihilism,  hypocrisy  and
pretensions  to  religiosity,  rule.  Paternalism  is  in  command  and  the  dominant
relationship in society is that between the follower and the followed, the disciple and
the mujtahid (religious authority). Such societies have sunk into a lumpen, get-rich-
at-all-costs mentality, glorifying both money and violence, aggressive towards the weak
yet simultaneously characterized by sycophancy and opportunism.
How can a society which has fallen victim to pan-Islamism throw off this massive dead
weight of cultural psychological trauma? What is to be done? Our purpose here is to
issue an invitation - for a dialogue over one of the most vexed questions of our time.
What are we to do about a blind and reactionary revolt of the downtrodden?
A child  of our  time and  a product  of the ruinous effects of advanced  capitalism in
Islamic societies of the periphery, Radical Islam confronts the left with its most difficult
challenge:  how to  respond  to  a  reactionary,  grass-roots  movement,  arising  out  of
desperation  -  a  movement  which  destroys  class,  cultural  and  even  psycho-social
potential, leaving society disarmed and ill-equipped meaningfully to confront its own
ruinous state. The actual response of the left has not so far been edifying. Both in the
region,  and  at  a  global  level,  it  is  paralysed  by  a  phenomenon  that  presents  a
contradictory challenge to its instincts.
Here is a movement with claims to a mythical past, but born ‘out of time’; a movement
promising to lift millions into a just future based on that illusionary past. It is born into
a  present  characterised  by  increasing  polarisation  of  wealth  and  poverty,  of
development  and  backwardness,  which  consigns  millions  to  the  rubbish  heap  in
advanced  capitalism’s  backyard.  At  one  level  the  movement  consists  of  the  most
downtrodden in society, crying out for their rightful share; on another, it tramples on
those very structures and social formations with the potential for progressive change.
On the one hand,  this movement  espouses anti-imperialist  slogans,  on  the other,  it
destroys the class which can truly organise to overturn imperialist domination. It saves
the capitalist mode of production from the onslaught of those who want to tear down its
ramparts, but at the same time it disrupts capitalist accumulation and provokes the
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wrath of global capital. It mobilises huge numbers around the slogans of ‘equality of
the Islamic umma’ (community) and an end to hunger, and yet its policies drive society
into ever  greater  unequal  development,  poverty  and  social  polarisation.  It  calls for
‘independence’, and sacriﬁces all political freedoms. It calls for ‘freedom.’ and enslaves
the female half of the population -  not to mention minorities and all those who think
differently.  In  the name of the right  to cultural  independence it  discards universal
rights and justifies despotism, forcing a grey uniformity on millions. In the name of
participatory democracy it makes millions assent to the increase of absolutist power
over  them  -  seemingly  giving  a  willing  ‘yea’  to  slavery.  People  are  increasingly
mobilised  and  politicised  only  to  end  up  being  pulversied  into  individual  units
expressing their opposition in a depoliticised culture of negativistic rejection; and a
movement that declared itself the anti-corruption movement to end all such movements
itself weaves corruption into the very fabric of society.
There have been two basic  reactions to Radical  Islam, the ﬁrst  a policy of political
alliance; the second one of confrontation, with the aim of bringing about its ultimate
destruction. With the end of the Cold War, the ﬁrst response – from the point of view of
the left – has faded. But at its height both left and right followed the hallowed doctrine
of ‘uniting against the common enemy.’ Radical Islam was both anti-capitalist and it
was anti-communist, so at no stage was it short of potential allies – whether from the
Soviet  bloc  with  its blind  ‘anti-imperialism’;  or  from the imperialist  countries,  with
their  virulent  anti-communism.  On  the  left  there  were  diﬀerent  attitudes  to  the
potential alliance. Believers in the ‘non-capitalist road to socialism’, for example, saw it
as strategic and unconditional; for others it was tactical, dependent in the longer term
on the attainment of proletarian hegemony within the revolution. But there were also
perceived  advantages  in  an  alliance  for  capitalism,  which  was  itself  instrumental
(directly and through client states) in bringing anti-communist Islam into being and
encouraging its growth as part of its policy to contain the working-class movement.
The methodology of both left and right has been identical: you identify your opposite -
anti-imperialism for some, anti-communism for others – and ally with its opposite. For
the left, it is important to recognize, however belatedly, that this method never had
much to with Marxism. It was, rather, a product of Stalinist distortions -  vulgarised
further in the light of the revolutionary peasant movement in China.
After the Cold War
When the end of the Cold War took one bloc out of the equation, both right and left
turned to a policy of confrontation. In general terms, two main trends can be discerned
in the way the surviving (capitalist) bloc, and its allies, faced Radical Islam. The ﬁrst
was to liquidate it  ideologically;  the second  to combine pressure and  threats with
appeasement and aid to force it on to a path of ‘reform.’ Neither was new. Both had, for
example,  been  practised  by  the  builders  of the  modern  state  in  Islamic  countries
earlier in the century – by Ataturk in Turkey, by Reza Shah in Iran, by Bourghiba in
Tunisia, in post-war Syria, and even in Pakistan (ostensibly an ‘Islamic state’), and so
on. What is new is the vigour with which, and the scale on which, these policies are
being pursued today.
Modernisation  and  the formation  of the modern  state in  the countries listed  above
involved,  above  all,  a  process  where  social  institutions  and  values  had  to  be
secularised; where rationalism replaced hadith (actions or sayings of the Prophet and
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the  imams)  and  where  laws  that  can  be  changed  replace  immutable  divine  law
(sharia’a). Those hoping to reform Radical Islam argue that pan-Islamism is a cultural
movement,  and  a  reaction  to  the  formation  of  the  modern  state.  These  states
overturned  social  structures too rapidly,  provoking  a blind  and  angry  reaction.  As
these people were unabsorbed in the modern state their political reaction against that
state has taken a religious form.
Those who argue thus remind  the proponents of the policy  of the whip  that  belief
cannot be suppressed through repression. The answer, accordingly, is to put a brake
on  change,  and  introduce  certain  reforms  favouring  religion,  while  retaining  the
overall framework of the modern state. The ploy is to change the ruling bloc in such a
way as to broaden the social base of the regime. An alliance is sought with one section
of religion against another. The resulting political stability is thought to weaken the
appeal  of  Radical  Islam,  and  marginalising  it  in  the  political  equation.  It  is  vital,
however, to keep the new Islamic allies away from the key centres of power (the army,
the  security  apparatus,  etc.).  Examples  where  such  policies  have  been  put  into
practice are Jordan, Yemen, Pakistan and, earlier, Egypt.
A variant of this policy is proposed for those countries where neither the prospects of a
coalition government exist, nor is the secular state viable. This is to abandon the quest
for modernisation and leave the task of amalgamating the national capital with global
capital  -  that is the task of reconciling the capitalist  infrastructure with aspects of
religious culture - in the hands of reformist Islam. The aim is to stabilise the political
structure of society while avoiding the dangers of outright modernisation. Unlike the
ﬁrst  proposition,  which  holds  that  the  rigidity  of  sharia’a  cannot  cope  with  the
changing needs of a modern state, this one believes that religion and capitalism can be
reconciled. The argument between these two interpretations is ongoing.
The two views share a common core.  They rely  on Islamic  reformists to secure the
interests of the West -  in the one argument as a junior partner to secularists; in the
other, in their own right. The task of making the political and economic structures of
capitalism compatible with indigenous culture (in a country of the periphery)  is,  in
both cases, given over to reformist Islam – though it is understood that some outside
pressure  must  be  brought  to  bear  on  religious  thought  to  force  it  to  seek
accommodation with secularism and take the road to transformation. Needless to say
neither policy ever operates in its pure form. Specific conditions impose some degree
of compromise between the diﬀerent roads (in Algeria or Egypt, for example), resulting
in highly complex policies, and, in some cases, repeated U-turns.
Wrong analysis, doomed policies
Such policies are all likely to fail, in the main because they do not address the root
cause of Radical Islam. The movement is not a reaction against the modern state. It is a
product of the effects of the modern state in a peripheral country in globalised, late
capitalism.
The  reformers  who  see  the  pan-Islamist  movement  as  a  cultural  phenomenon,  a
reaction  to  the  formation  of  the  modern  state  and  the  over-hasty  destruction  of
traditional  structures,  are  on  slippery  ground.  They  mistake  cause  for  eﬀect  and
cannot explain why this ‘reaction’ occurred in the 1980s -  in some of the countries
involved  over  half a century  after  the modern  state was established.  Nor  can  they
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understand the explosion taking place today, when, thirty years ago, Radical Islam was
effortlessly crushed by Nasserism.
Our argument is that Radical Islam is a reaction to the effects of particular forms of
modernisation,  not to modernisation per se.  This is not a trivial  difference. For one
thing, understanding it profoundly affects the strategies needed (and discussed below)
to  overcome political  Islam.  The  idea  that  its  successes  simply  represent  a  social
reaction to secularisation ignores the fact that virtually all these societies are multi-
cultural  formations,  in  which  advanced  capitalism  exists  precariously  alongside
pre-capitalist  and  even  tribal  structures.  Sizeable sections of society  are not  at  all
averse to modernisation.  Theories dependent on the idea that Islamic countries are
simply backward ignore this complex cultural reality. Moreover, examples of the failure
of the policy of accommodation abound. Appeasement has not diminished the spectre of
Radical  Islam in  Pakistan.  Saudi  Arabia  fed  and  helped  create  Hamas  and  FIS to
counter radicalism, only to find they have become a radical threat to their sponsors.
The  appeasement  strategy  is  doomed  in  practice,  just  as  it  can  be  shown  to  be
mistaken in theory.
The Iranian left
According to sections of the Iranian left, faithful to a highly formalistic, deeply rooted
economism and a crude statism,  any government that  increased state ownership  at
home, and sided with the so-called ‘socialist  bloc’  abroad, was a natural ally  of the
world proletariat, regardless of the degree of participatory democracy it permitted or
the relations of production it established. State ownership was even identiﬁed as the
criterion for ‘socialist’ transformation.
An alternative view, more recently in vogue, rightly rejects such statist economism,
but  only  to replace it  by  another  one-sided  view,  this time immersed  in  a cultural
interpretation. Culture and ideology are considered the essential elements of Radical
Islam, and also the route to its negation. One such interpretation combs the past in
search of anti-orthodox-religious elements in national culture. One favoured source is
Islamic mysticism, but there are also pre-Islamic movements, such as Manichaeism and
Mazdakism.  Egalitarian  and  humanistic  elements  in  mysticism  are  brought  in  to
confront official organised religion, and to create an alternative to it.
In contrast, there are those who declare that there is nothing in national culture on
which to build.  This argument,  made by many prominent thinkers of the ‘new left’,
claims that democracy will never take root in Iran and similar societies unless cultural
backwardness can be confronted. Total secularism and modernism is their solution for
a free and democratic society and economic growth. Such concepts as mystical ‘love’
and ‘self-sacriﬁce’ are seen as a total negation of nature: they cannot be the building-
blocks of a socialist future. ‘Love’ is inseparable from the love of god, they argue, and
at its core lies a death-worship. Such thinkers advocate a total rejection of national
culture and union with world culture.
These are both intellectual movements seeing culture as central and deﬁning the task
as the creation of a new one. The latter group claims to follow Heidegger – but they are
not particularly faithful to him, since they propose to build a new culture from scratch,
rejecting  all  existing  culture.  The  eﬀect  of  such  a  strategy  is  to  separate  the
intellectual completely from society. And, despite their claim to articulate a radical left
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solution, they echo the liberal cry that it is not possible to have democracy, or take
steps towards socialism, in societies on the periphery of world capitalism, especially in
countries where a tradition based on religion exists.
The international Left
Interestingly the positions taken by the left outside Iran have similar overtones. A few
diehards continue to cling to the economist view that  ‘the enemy of my enemy is my
friend.’  This  was most  clearly  demonstrated  in  the  position  taken  by  some on  the
Mujahedin  in  Afghanistan,  and  during   the  Second  Gulf  War.  The  folly  of  this
philosophy was best illustrated by the way all but an unrepentant few have now had to
eat their words about this policy as they applied it to Iran. Others take a pragmatic
line, seeing their alliance with pan-Islamism as tactical and temporary. They argue that
it is important to unite against imperialism at this juncture, and deal with future rifts
as and  when  they  arise.  Most  of those who took this ostrich-like view in  Iran  are,
unfortunately, no longer in this world to see the folly of their ways. Those (particularly
in  the  Palestinian  movement)  who  think  they  might  work  this  strategy  more
successfully  (and  less fatally  to themselves)  should  remember  the innate enmity  of
Radical Islam – itself a brittle coalition of antagonistic class interests – towards any
ideology that looks at the world through class spectacles. The third view is even more
pernicious. It  wraps its intensely racist theories in seemingly libertarian words. Let
each  people  follow its  own  cultural  norms,  it  holds.  By  rejecting  universal  human
rights this view is, at best, a form of vulgar populism and, at worse, dangerously racist,
conﬁning  large tracts of humanity  to permanent  exclusion  from rights enjoyed  (as
rights)  by  others.  Not  surprisingly  they  found  themselves,  at  the 1993  Vienna UN
Conference on Human Rights, sharing a platform with some our planet’s most vicious
regimes.
We have argued, then, that Radical Islam is of our time – a child born not ‘out of time’
but rather out of today’s profound economic, political and ideological crisis. In relation
to this,  the ‘cultural’  crisis is not  so much a cause as a blindly  reactionary  eﬀect.
Radical Islam is not a response to the modern state, modern culture or the separation
of  the  religion  and  state,  but  rather  to  mass  unemployment,  destitution  and
hopelessness brought about by the modern state. It is not so much a reaction to the
essence  of  modernism but  to  the  ravages  of  advanced  capitalism in  a  part  of  its
periphery. Those thrown on to the rubbish heap of history claw at the nearest available
ideology at a time when liberalism, nationalism and known forms of socialism are all
sinking in a quagmire. The past rules the present in those societies not because of its
robustness, but more because of the feebleness of the alternatives.
It  is,  therefore, futile to imagine that  any project that does not offer a fundamental
solution to the political and economic crisis can forestall  the genesis and growth of
such blind  and  ultimately  destructive movements.  It  is also clear  that  any  political
solution must be accompanied by a cultural renaissance congenial to human feeling,
intellect and thought. This requires nothing less than a full-scale ideological spring-
cleaning  for  the  left.  The three major  planks on  which  the  left  must  confront  the
pan-Islamist  movement  are:  first,  the  formulation  of  an  independent  and  radical
economic programme; second the development of a coherent political  platform; and
third, a thorough overhaul of its own system of beliefs and ideas about organisation.
A radical economic alternative to neo-liberalism
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Where  advanced  capitalism is  polarising  the  world  into  extremes of affluence  and
poverty  that  now  transcend  geographical  boundaries,  one  cannot  talk  of  an
independent  economic  programme that  does  not  challenge  neo-liberalism at  every
level.  This  means  confronting  the  so-called  structural  adjustment  policies  of  the
International  Monetary  Fund  and  the  World  Bank,  which  are  bringing  about  the
destitution of millions in the North as well as in the South. It is on this ground that the
left must distinguish itself from the liberals who also seek to woo the masses breaking
away from Radical Islam. In the South this means a number of things.
First, key sections of the economy need to be in public control, which is not necessarily
the same as state control. It has to be promoted as the most suitable form within which
the  labour  force  can  be  directly  involved  in  production,  with  a  major  input  into
meaningful  decision-making.  Second,  the  producers  must  control  the  means  of
production not just in legal terms (such as an article in the constitution) but in real
political and practical terms. Third, the right balance must be created between central
planning  (without  which  it  would  be  impossible  to overcome the inequalities)  and
decentralised workers control. Fourth, the system of social security must improve the
quality  of life – something that  cannot  be achieved without the working population
controlling  state  expenditure,  in  particular  with  regard  to  welfare,  subsidies  and
wages.
These, and other similar, economic policies are crucial if the left is to unite with, and
mobilize  its  main  social  base  –  the  downtrodden.  Only  with  a  radical  programme
addressing  the  root  cause  of  mass  destitution,  confronting  the  core-periphery
contradictions, and showing how to overcome uneven development, can the left attract
its natural class allies away from the clutches of Islamic obscurantism.
Clearing out ideological baggage on the left: alliances and cultural heritage
As we argued in part one of this essay, the Islamic movement filled a vacuum created
by the ideological feebleness of the two main social classes – the native bourgeoisie and
the young working class. But we must also confront the fact that the left, as it exists in
these countries  today,  is  singularly  ill  equipped  to lead  the implementation  of the
programme  outlined  above.  A  major  rethink  is  necessary  if  the  left  is  to  ﬁll  this
ideological  vacuum  before  those  who  would  promote  bourgeois  alternatives  have
produced new prescriptions with their already sharpened pens. Without such a rethink
the left can entertain no hope of truly representing the interests of workers, organising
working-class struggles,  and  becoming  integral  to a genuinely  mass force in  those
societies. Two aspects of this need particularly urgent reappraisal, the ﬁrst relating to
alliances, the second to the cultural inheritance of the left.
It is time the left returned to a class-based analysis of historical development, too often
ignored  in  the  recent  past.  It  must  make  all  alliances  with  political  forces  and
organisations conditional on the true class interest of the working class it claims to
represent.  For  too  long  it  has  made  the  most  incredible  contortions  to  justify  its
support  and  alliance with  a variety  of unsavoury  groups.  A  crude anti-imperialism,
devoid of any class analysis,  fed at times by the totally discredited theories of ‘non
capitalist road to socialism’ have underlined these justiﬁcations. The support given to
the Islamic  Republic  (a regime which  systematically  and  brutally  destroyed  all  the
working-class  and  democratic  organisations  and  structures  that  grew  out  of  an
anti-capitalist revolution) was, in some places, given out of sheer pragmatism or even
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opportunism; in others, from a genuine but misguided anti-imperialism.
The  left  has  to  wake  up  to  the  fact  that  in  the  interface  between  the  ravages  of
advanced  capitalism in  the  South  (and  also  the  North)  and  the  weakness  of  the
working-class  alternatives  (organisationally  and  ideologically)  a  whole  series  of
movements and insurrections will arise with ‘radical’ and even ‘anti-capitalist’ content.
The  left  of  today  and  tomorrow  faces  movements,  often  from  below,  fuelled  by
desperation,  and  containing  a  bewildering  intermix  of progressive  and  reactionary
elements. To steer a course of solidarity and alliance in this morass requires a clear
vision of the left’s future, based on a clear understanding of where the interests of the
working  class  lie.  The  experience  of  the  Iranian  revolution,  and  of  other  major
twentieth-century revolutions, clearly points to the fact that all alliances and solidarity
must  be  subordinated  to  one  consideration  only:  does  the  policy  serve  the  true
interests of the working class?
Without a thorough reappraisal  of its cultural  and intellectual  heritage the left  will
remain marginalised in the huge battles ahead. The ideological vacuum will be filled by
various bourgeois alternatives: liberal here, totalitarian and fascistic there. The left, on
both sides of the North/South divide has a long way to go. Meanwhile, the cultural and
human ravages of advanced capitalism will  continue to be met by the opposite but
equally appalling ravages wrought in the name of false utopias, generated from the
turbulent depths of the despair of the ‘wretched of the earth.’
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